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The Great War in the Middle East as a Semi-Modern War
by
Frank JACOB and Riccardo ALTIERI
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Introduction
The Middle-East was depicted as a sideshow of the First World War. With lesser
casualties as they were caused in the battles of the Western front in Europe, more
mobility and space for individual heroic actions it seemed to provide more space for
traditional war tactics, which were no longer useful as a consequence of the highly
modernized warfare in Europe. Edmund Allenby (1861-1936)1 and Thomas E. Lawrence
(1888-1935)2 became the key figures of the Middle Eastern campaigns, while Gallipoli
should become an emblem for British failure during the war years.3 However, it was not
1!

Lawrence James: Imperial warrior: the life and times of Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby 1861–
1936 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993).
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Scott Anderson: Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle
East (New York: Doubleday, 2013); Bruce Leigh: T. E. Lawrence: Warrior and Scholar (Oxford: Tattered
Flag, 2014); Lowell Thomas: With Lawrence in Arabia (London: Hutchinson & Co., 2011 [1924]).
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Gregory A. Thiele, “Why Did Gallipoli Fail? Why Did Albion Succeed? A Comparative Analysis of
Two World War I Amphibious Assaults,” Baltic Security and Defence Review 13:2 (2011), 128.
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only the military genius of the two commanders which was responsible for the success of
their campaigns; they were fighting different kinds of war.
The landing operation of Gallipoli4 was far more modern that one would assume by
subsuming it to the Middle Eastern war scenario. The region itself was never a
homogenous region, but in contrast left sufficient space for different tactics and the use of
modern technology.5 Soldiers fighting in the Middle East could face trench warfare, gas
war6, attacks by planes, heavy artillery, machine gun fire, barbed wire on the one hand,
but also cavalry and camel attacks, guerilla warfare, surprise attacks and ambushes on the
other. The Middle East thereby resembled the “art of war” of the European Western and
Eastern front at the same time, and could be seen as a semi-modern war as a whole, a fact
that the present paper wants to underline.
Therefore we will compare different campaigns and the use of modern technology
to show, why specific battlefields highly resembled the problematic situation of Western
European battlefields while others left sufficient space for the creation of heroes and
legends at the same time. After a discussion of the Gallipoli operation we will switch the
4!

Gallipoli “produced a very large English language historiography, but Ottoman/Turkish sources are
notably absent in the bibliographies of these books. The result is a one-sided view of the campaign.” Tim
Travers, “The Ottoman Crisis of May 1915 at Gallipoli,” War in History 8:1 (2001), 72. The Turkish
General Staff Archives are hard to visit, anyway the Ottoman sources are written in Arabic script. Ibid., p.
73. “There are no personal diaries of key individuals, because this was not an Ottoman tradition.” Ibid.
For the Ottoman perspective see Edward Erickson, Ordered to die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the
First World War (Westport, CT: Preager, 2000).
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John J. Curry, “Review: Meyer, Karl E. and Shareen Blair Brysac: Kingmakers: The Invention of the
Modern Middle East (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 2008),” The Historian (2010), 631-632.
6!

L.F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford, 1986).
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focus to the more mobile campaigns on the Arabian Peninsula have a close look at the
tactics used by “Lawrence of Arabia”. We thereby aim to show the diversity of the
Middle East as a theater of the First World War to strengthen the demand for more
detailed studies of these war spaces, which should no longer simply focus on the failure
of Gallipoli or the hero of the Arabian war scene.

!
Gallipoli
Gallipoli is mostly known as one of the darkest hour of British military history7 and is
well described by Peter Doyle and Matthew R. Bennett as “a costly gamble intended to
knock Turkey out of the war and to command the main supply line to Russia”8. Much has
been said about the reasons for the failure:

!
“A combination of factors led to the failure of this plan, most particularly the
ineffective-ness of naval artillery fire against land targets, the presence of mobile
batteries on both the European and Asian shores and ineffective minesweeping by the
Allies. This ultimately caused an escalation of the conflict, and a commitment to
deploy troops in an invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula.”9

7!

For example Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The First War in the Middle East (London: Hurst, 2014).

8!

Peter Doyle and Matthew R. Bennett, “Military Geography: The Influence of Terrain in the Outcome of
the Gallipoli Campaign, 1915,” The Geographical Journal 165:1 (1999), 12.
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Ibid.
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Furthermore the geographic setting was responsible for the problems the soldiers had to
face after their landing began. “[T]he local inadequacy of water supplies, the steepness of
slopes, the incision of ravines, the precipitous nature of the cliffs, and the density of
vegetation”10 made the life of the troops as miserable as the higher positions of the
Ottoman soldiers and their machine guns.
However, also the personal factor was responsible for the disastrous developments.
While “Sir Ian Hamilton [1853-1947] was precisely the sort of commander that one
might have chosen to lead the Dardanelles Expedition” the final campaign “proved [him]
to be indecisive and lacking a firm hand with his subordinates.”11 He was not able to give
clear orders or to become a strong and energetic leader for the landing troops, why he
finally lost the public and governmental believe in his capabilities as a military
commander.12 The withdrawal “in humiliation and defeat”13 was also due to the
inexperience of the troops, which were sent from different parts of the empire to execute

10
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Ibid, 14.

11
! Thiele,

Gallipoli, 141.
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Dardanelles Commission, The Final Report of the Dardanelles Commission: Part II – Conduct of
Operations, &c. (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, n. d.), 87.
!
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Edward J. Erickson, “Strength Against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915,”
The Journal of Military History 65 (2001), 981.
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a poorly planned mission.14 The general staff had not possessed sufficient intelligence
information about the situation on the peninsula and the quality of the maps was really
bad.15
Despite this lack the mission was started, especially because the Dardanelles had
been a strategic target in the war planning of the Royal Navy from the beginning of the
war. In addition to the “the deadlock on the Western Front” and her majesty’s
governments “appeals for assistance from Russia early in January 1915”16 the important
figure of the British government and the British Navy, including Winston Churchill (First
Lord of the Admiralty) and David Lloyd George (Chancellor of the Exchequer) were in
favor of a fleet operation against Istanbul by sending a fleet through the straits, which
would force one of the central powers out of war.17 But the Ottoman Empire was not
unprepared and the military staff knew that the Dardanelles might be a target of the
enemy.18 Liman von Sanders and Enver Paşa were well prepared to welcome the British
and French landing and therefore “Sanders's ideas were formed before the Allied naval

14
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C. F. Aspinail-Oglander, History of the Great War, Based on Official Documents: Military Operations
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1981).
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Ian Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), Vol 1, 14; Thiele, “Gallipoli Fails”,
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attempts of February-March 1915 to break through into the Sea of Marmara, and
therefore he stressed the need to defend the artillery of the Straits against Allied naval and
land attacks.”19 Consequently “[a]t no time after 17 August 1914 (…) were the
Dardanelles defences unready to receive an attack”20 and the British underestimation of
their Ottoman enemy should cost many lives. In contrast to the assumptions of the
military planners in London

!
“[t]he Ottoman General Staff sent its best combat infantry divisions to defend the
jugular of their empire. These divisions were well trained, well led, and very
effective. The Gallipoli peninsula itself was the most heavily defended area in the
Ottoman Empire, and the defensive planning for its retention encompassed years of
effort and refinement. The principal tactical commander on the ground, Esat Paşa,
was extremely energetic and experienced in the kind of fighting found on the
peninsula, as were most of his subordinate leaders.”21
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Fighting against “the cream of the Ottoman Army”22 the campaign was doomed from its
start to resemble the bloody war of the Western front, a fact that was also supported by
the terrain, which left only room for a stalemate leading to trench warfare.
Anyway, War Minister Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916)23 was optimistic, because
he did not expect any resistance from the Ottoman side, a miscalculation that might have
been a consequence of imperial arrogance as well.24 Hamilton and his staff were
consequently “assembled in a piecemeal fashion”25 and briefed only vaguely about the
environment. The commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force therefore had to
admit that the peninsula “looks a much tougher nut to crack than it did over the map”26.
Additionally no surprise factor could help Hamilton to gain an advantage, because von
Sanders had already heard rumors about an expedition and was able to get even more
detailed information out of Egyptian newspapers.27 Finally it seemed not to be surprising
at all when British as well as ANZAC troops lands on the southern and western parts of
the Gallipoli Peninsula on 25 April 1915.
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Peter King: The Viceroy’s fall: how Kitchener destroyed Curzon (Sidgwick & Jackson, London 1986).
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Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, vol 1, 27.
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Having no special equipment for an amphibious landing operation the soldiers had to
land by getting towed to the shore in simple rowboats. There, the well prepared units of
the Fifth Ottoman Army were already waiting to do its “bloody job.”28 Finally, the
“British assumptions regarding the Ottoman Army’s fighting prowess (which should have
been questioned before the landing occurred) were about to have disastrous
consequences.”29
The Ottoman soldiers started immediately to open fire against the approaching
British and Australian troops and from the beginning of the operation it was clear, that it
would not become the easy job the military staff had believed in. Hamilton’s men had to
face machine guns and barbed wire. Consequently, their situation resembled the one of
the soldiers in France. Hamilton seemed to recognize the hopeless situation when he
writes:

!
“we are struggling like drowning mariners in a sea of chaos; chaos in the offices;
chaos on the ships; chaos in the camps; chaos along the wharves”30.

!
The military staff was looking for alternatives to end the stalemate, which should last
until the end of the operation, why the Gallipoli campaign – like the Western and Eastern

28
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Erickson, Gallipoli, 30.

! Thiele,
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Gallipoli, 136.

Hamilton, Gallipoli, vol 1, 80.
!8

front in Europe31 – reached a chemical level of warfare as well.32 The leading officers
speculated about the use of gas, which was finally not used until a year later in Palestine,
but the hopeless situation on the peninsula made people think loud about the use of gas as
well.33 While the entente had hoped to overcome the trench warfare of the Western front
by the landing operation it opened a second stalemate scenario which resembled the
technological warfare of the rest of Europe.
Consequently more than 30,000 respirators and 10,000 ‘gas helmets’34 were
shipped to the battlefields of the peninsula, because one feared an Ottoman gas attack as
well. All in all the Gallipoli campaign was similar to those fought in Western Europe and

31
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For a survey of works dealing with chemical and biological warfare see Eric Croddy, Chemical and
Biological Warfare: An Annotated Bibliography (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1997). Andy Thomas,
Effects of Chemical Warfare: A Selective Review and Bibliography of British State Papers (London,:
SIPRI, 1984); Charles E. Heller, Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American Experience, 1917-1918
(Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute, 1985); L. F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare
in the First World War (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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Yigal Sheffy, “The Chemical Dimension of the Gallipoli Campaign: Introducing Chemical Warfare to
the Middle East,“ War in History 12:3 (2005), 278.
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Ibid, 280. “Winston Spencer Churchill, first lord of the Admiralty, took the matter a step further. An
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respirators. The mask, nicknamed ‘Hypo’, consisted of a flannel bag impregnated with substances such as
glycerine, bicarbonate or hyposulphate of soda (hence the name) that were to neutralize chlorine and tear
gases.” Ibid., 283.
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regardless of the fact that the “operation was a fiasco”35, it was a modern one. Modern
warfare with all its technological possibilities to kill the enemy had determined the
battlefield at Gallipoli. This was no spot for heroic battles; it was a spot to die from
machine gun fire, artillery shells, or as a consequence of the harsh weather in the winter.
When the governmental leaders as well as the military staff recognized the failure, they
decided to evacuate the troops between December 1915 and January 1916 and “in stark
contrast with the landings in April and August 1915, was well-planned”36.

!
Lawrence
Compared to Gallipoli, another setting of the First World War was able to create a hero,
who had to wage a totally different kind of warfare. Thomas E. Lawrence, who became a
galleon figure of British guerilla warfare in the Great War, was also promoted by the
exotic setting he was fighting in as well as by the stylization through the modern mass
media.
Lawrence had been no military tactician who was trained for guerilla warfare in
the Arabian deserts, a fact that he recognized by himself:
“I was not practiced in that technique. I was unlike a soldier: hated soldiering. Of course,
I had read the usual books (too many books), Clausewitz and Jomini, Mahan and Foch,
35
! Thiele,
!
36

Gallipoli, 137.

Ibid.
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had played at Napoleon’s campaigns, worked at Hannibal’s tactics, and the wars of
Belisarius, like any other man at Oxford; but I had never thought myself into the mind of
a real commander compelled to fight a campaign of his own.”37
Despite this lack of experience, he was a man that could be made a myth38, one that is
still repeated in modern works about “Lawrence of Arabia” who set the desert on fire.39
While the Arabian fight against the Ottoman rule was depicted in romantic ways, the
support of the Royal Navy for resupply as well as air support was needed to win the
battles.40 The Arab irregulars might have been a powerful force, but they were “as unable
to defend a point or line as they are to attack it”41. Lawrence must have realized “that in a
stand-up fight against the better-disciplined Turks the Arabs would be doomed.”42

37
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E. Lawrene, Seven Pillars of Wisdom,
h t t p s : / / i a 8 0 2 5 0 8 . u s . a r c h i v e . o r g / 1 / i t e m s /
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(accessed 8 January 2015). See also Thomas E. Lawrene, Oriental Assembly (London: Williams and
Norgate LTD., 1939), 109.
38
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33: 2 (1997), 267.
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Therefore he reacted by starting a guerilla war, for which the environment was
predestined:
“How would the Turks defend all that (140,000 square miles) – no doubt by a trench
line across the bottom, if the Arabs were an army attacking with banners displayed
(…) but suppose they were an influence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without
front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile as a
whole, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. The Arabs might be a
vapour, blowing where they listed. It seemed that a regular soldier might be helpless
without a target. He would own the ground he sat on, and what he could poke his
rifle at.”43

Lawrence also recognized the potential of such a campaign for the total scenario of the
First World War:
“A man who could fight well by himself made generally a bad soldier, and these
champions seemed to me no material for our drilling; but if we strengthened them by
light automatic guns of the Lewis type, to be handled by themselves, they might be
capable of holding their hills and serving as an efficient screen behind which we
could build up”.44

43
!

Lawrence, Guerilla Warfare.
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While the press explained the heroic fight of the Arabs under the leadership of a noble
Englishmen to the world public by describing the war in Arabia as a conflict, where a
single man was still able to make a difference, and thereby proving that the old way of
warfare might still exist, Lawrence himself had already recognized, that also a guerilla
war needed modern technology to become successful, because otherwise his forces were
not able to hold conquered spots – e.g. Umtaiye.45 Working with old tactics and modern
technology, the war in Arabia was definitely semi-modern, like the conflict in the Middle
East as a whole.

!
!
Conclusion
While the troops at Gallipoli faced the cruelties of a modern technological warfare,
almost including gas attacks, Lawrence in the southern parts of the Middle East, like
Allenby in Palestine, was able to act fast and use his higher level of mobility. His
“operations were like naval warfare, in their mobility, their ubiquity, their independence
of bases and communications, in their ignoring of ground features, of strategic areas, of
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45

Ibid.
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fixed directions, of fixed points.”46 This provided the stage for the creation of a myth, as
the war in Arabia “was simple and individual”47 and could make a hero out of Lawrence.
It was not only the bad planning that made Gallipoli a failure, the geographical
setting of the campaign as well as the fact that the British and ANZAC soldiers had to
face the best equipped and modernized troops of the Ottoman Empire, led by capable
officers, made this the most modern battlefield of the Middle Eastern theater of war.
Taking these different places, scenarios, and outcomes into consideration, it seems to be
suitable to call the Great War in the Middle East as a whole a semi-modern war.
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